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earnings are greater than the median. Supporting this view is the evidence from Farber and Saks regarding individual voting in NLRB representation elections that suggests that support for unionism is inversely related to one's position in the intrafirm earnings distribution.4 Worker demand for rate standardization may also be an attempt to lower at least some forms of risk. Unionism provides a collective voice through which workers can bargain for measurable, objective standards and pay based on welldefined job categories. Overall, many workers may desire less intrafirm wage dispersion across and within job classifications.
Utilizing detailed microdata, Freeman finds that unions significantly decrease the dispersion of wages in more highly unionized establishments in both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. The dispersion in earnings is reduced in part because wage-determining characteristics have smaller effects in the union sector and because less dispersion exists within given cells of workers with similar characteristics.5 Freeman concludes that these withinsector effects of unionism that narrow differentials outweigh union wage effects that increase across-industry wage dispersion so that, on net, unionism reduces wage inequality.
A recent paper by Quan has also attempted to estimate union effects on the size distribution of earnings.6 After estimating the incidence of unionism by earnings class and assuming equal percentage union wage effects across classes, he makes a comparison of the Gini coefficients of union and nonunion earnings. With one of his two microdata sets he finds greater equality among union earnings, though the magnitude of the difference is small.
While both these papers support the belief that unionism acts to decrease earnings dispersion, neither addresses directly the possibility that earnings dispersion and unionism are simultaneously determined. Freeman does examine the possibility that the lower dispersion in earnings in the union sector is due to less variability in worker characteristics among unionized establishments, rather than to direct union effects on the wage structure. He concludes, however, that differences in worker characteristics explain only a "moderate" amount of the difference and that union effects on the wage structure are primarily responsible for the narrower dispersion among union wages. While Freeman does an excellent job in adjusting for worker and firm characteristics, he does not test directly for simultaneity between unionism and earnings dispersion.
While this recent literature has stressed the wage-narrowing effects of unionism, there are also reasons for believing that the earnings structure may directly affect the degree of unionism. The determinants of unionization have previously been examined within an economic framework in which equilibrium levels are determined by the interaction of demand and supply. This framework has been used to analyze changes in unionism over time and differences across industries, states, and SMSAs.7 Union membership is regarded as an asset providing a flow of pecuniary and nonpecuniary services to utility-maximizing workers. After specifying union demand and supply functions, and assuming observed unionism is at an equilibrium level, a reduced-form union equation can be estimated. Empirical specification of such a model requires identification and measurement of those variables expected to influence the demand for or supply of unionism.
We believe there are good reasons for expecting equilibrium levels of unionization also to be affected by the dispersion in earnings. Note that unionism has important public good characteristics and that the equilibrium (though generally not efficient) level of a public good is determined by the preferences of the median voter.I Most of the services unions provide (or, for unorganized workers, propose to provide) are nonrival, and exclusion from these services is difficult. For instance, all workers within a bargaining unit are covered by a single contract; thus, workers in similar circumstances receive roughly similar treatment, and generally none can be excluded from contract provisions. Other types of union services, such as assistance in handling grievances, may of course have less of these public-good aspects. Union coverage can be treated then as offering to workers a single package of expected services that-for workers with preferences near those of the median voter-are likely to be close to their preferred package, while expected benefits are likely to be small (or negative) for workers with preferences far from the median.
Assume that the less the earnings dispersion within an industry, the more homogeneous are workers in their characteristics and preferences. If this is correct, then it is likely that, other things equal, unionism will be greater in industries with less inequality in earnings. For any package of services a union can offer close to the preferences of the median voter, support for the union will be greater the more highly concentrated are preferences around the median. Stated differently, for a given level of demand for union services, a union can 8Existence of an equilibrium assumes preferences are single peaked. Because unions are likely to represent a package of issues, a cyclical majority (nonexistence) is a distinct possibility. more easily construct a package that will satisfy a majority the less dispersed are preferences around the median. Thus unionization should be more likely, more effective, and more stable politically the more homogeneous are a group of workers.
In addition, the benefits and costs of unionism may be related directly to the dispersion in worker preferences and characteristics. Similar workers are easily substitutable and are likely to be in a relatively weak individual bargaining position (they face a more elastic demand); thus, they may value collective bargaining more highly. We should also expect lower costs the more homogeneous are workers due to economies of scale in both the provision of union services (grievance procedures, institutionalized work rules, and so forth) and in negotiations with management. Management may also find economies of scale in bargaining with a union relative to the commonality in "voice" among its employees. While all the above arguments lead to an expected negative relationship between unionism and earnings dispersion, other factors may lead to a positive relationship. As discussed previously, workers may demand unions as a means to reduce some elements of risk or to decrease dispersion in compensation, both across and within job categories, leading to a positive effect of earnings dispersion on the extent of unionism. Because unions tend to represent the average (median) worker while the "market" will more closely represent the marginal worker, differences in preferences between average and marginal workers (as between existing and new workers, for example) may affect the likelihood of unionism. If relatively larger differences were to exist between average and marginal workers where earnings dispersion is greater, demand for union-induced wage equalization would be greater, leading to a positive unionism-inequality relationship (and vice versa). Where differences between average and marginal workers are small, worker demand for altering the market-determined compensation structure should be less. If all workers were identical, for instance, union wage standardization would bring about little if any change from the market-determined wage dispersion.
In addition, Farber and Saks and others have found that individuals are significantly more likely to vote for union representation if they believe both that employees have been treated unfairly and that unions ensure greater fairness. If these sentiments are more likely the greater the inequality in earnings, then a positive unionism-inequality relationship is again possible. Thus, if worker demand for union-induced wage equalization is large (and union election campaign literature suggests it often is), this demand may offset the negative unionismearnings-dispersion relationship outlined above.9
For these reasons, the relationship between unionism and the dispersion in earnings is a worthwhile empirical question. Of interest is not only whether and how earnings dispersion affects unionization, but also whether, after accounting for their simultaneous determination, the estimated equalizing effects of unions on earnings dispersion are less or greater than single equation estimates would suggest. After outlining a simultaneous model in which earnings, earnings dispersion, and unionism are endogenous, these relationships will be examined. role of worker complementarity in production, a condition that gives rise to unions as a mechanism to deal with the attendant public-good problems in such a workplace. Their reasoning suggests a negative correlation between unionism and the dispersion in productivity and earnings. Finally, Polachek, "Unionization of the White Collar Worker," has suggested another reason for believing there may be a systematic relationship between earnings dispersion (or the steepness of the earnings profile) and the extent of unionism. He argues that worker-firm bargaining associated with the implicit sharing of costs and benefits from specific on-the-job training acts as a substitute for unionism. He presents evidence showing that workers with more specific on-the-job training, as measured by the slope of the earnings profile, are less likely to be unionized and concludes that this helps explain why white-collar workers are less likely to be union members. For a number of reasons, while interesting, this hypothesis is not fully convincing. where vi is a random error term with zero mean and constant variance. Because we are unable to hold constant the covariances between the variables, predicted signs are ambiguous. However, we expect b1, b2, b3, b4, and b5 > 0 and b6 < 0. Finally, b7 > 0 would be consistent with findings elsewhere. Unionism equation. It has long been recognized that industries and workers that become highly unionized are likely to have different characteristics than those with little unionization. The use of OLS to measure the effect of unionism on wages is therefore likely to lead to biased estimates and thus many studies now use a simultaneousequations approach to estimate the determination of wages and unionism. As mentioned earlier, recent studies have also examined the effect of unions on wage dis-"2We do know that u 2(U)i is 0 when either no firms or all firms in an industry are unionized and that it is at a maximum (in some sense) when U = .5. Thus we might observe, ceteris paribus, earnings dispersion first increasing and then decreasing with the level of unionization.
persion and have found that unions narrow wage dispersion. However, only a few studies have suggested, and none have treated explicitly, the possibility that earnings dispersion affects unionization even though such effects are probable. In this section, a model of union determination is outlined in which earnings dispersion is treated as a determinant of unionism.
Adopting the demand-supply framework now common in the literature, we also include in the reduced-form unionism equation those variables expected to affect the benefits or costs of unionization. The level of earnings in an industry is expected to have a positive income effect on the demand and equilibrium level of unionism as long as union services are a normal good. Previous evidence from manufacturing industries, individuals, states, and SMSAs suggests that this relationship is statistically significant. The potential wage gain from unionization, typically measured by the proportional difference between union and nonunion wages, is not included here.'3 Blue-collar (or production) workers are more likely to be unionized than other workers, due partly to differences in organizing costs, tastes, and expected wage gains from unionism. Blue-collar workers are likely to have less identification with management, lower probability of self-employment, and greater homogeneity. Each of these factors should lead to greater demands for a union "voice." Duncan and Stafford have recently shown that unionism is more likely in jobs characterized by less flexible working conditions, where employees work with machines, and where there is greater interde-'3Such a measure cannot be observed directly with grouped data. Also, as pointed out by a referee, the potential union gain is a potential loss for the company; so greater firm resistance may be likely. Thus, the effect on the likelihood of unionization is indeterminate. pendency in the production process. Bluecollar jobs are more likely to be characterized by these conditions and, thus, more likely to be unionized.'4
The percentage of female workers in an industry is likely to be negatively related to the percent unionized. Industries with a high percent of females are more likely to contain jobs with less permanent attachment, making the benefits from unionism less and the costs of organizing greater. Unionism is also less likely in those industries with the most flexible working conditions, those same industries likely to have a higher percentage of female workers. Moreover, Freeman and Medoff have found that women covered by a collective bargaining agreement are less likely to be union members than are men.'5 A number of studies using individual data have found that, ceteris paribus, blacks are more likely to be union members than are whites, evidence consistent with the finding that the union wage effect is relatively higher for blacks.'6 There is little evidence from industry data, however, showing that the racial composition of an industry is an important determinant of its level of unionism. On the basis of preliminary results, the race variable was excluded from the unionism function.
The effect of the age structure on unionism is ambiguous. To the extent that older workers have fewer years over which to accumulate nonpension benefits and that unions flatten the age-earnings profile, older workers will be less likely to prefer union membership. To summarize, interindustry differences in unionism are expected to be related to earnings dispersion and those variables systematically related to the benefits and costs of unionism. The following specification reflects the discussion above. A Lorenz curve was then constructed in order to simulate the micro distribution by using a cubic spline technique modified from a published routine by Greville. The cubic spline method has been used to calculate Gini ratios and has been found to produce accurate results even where there are few data points.26 Gini coefficients were calculated after integration of the area under the constructed Lorenz curve. In order to simulate a micro distribution, each industry's earnings distribution was divided into 100 intervals (a compromise between accuracy and cost), each interval containing the number of persons and amount of earnings implied by the constructed Lorenz curve. From this generated data and the assumption that all persons within these narrow classes have identical earnings, we calculated the log of the geometric mean of earnings and the variance of the log of earnings. The simple correlation of the log of the geometric mean is .966 with the log of the median and .847 with the log of the mean. The correlation between a2(lnE) and the Gini coefficient is .927.
Variables measuring the distribution of schooling, age and experience, and weeks worked were also estimated from grouped data. It was assumed that all individuals were at the midpoints of their respective intervals; thus, all standard deviations and variances are underestimated. This presents no problem for estimation if relative differences across industries are accurately measured.
Empirical Results
Complete regression results for the earnings, earnings dispersion, and unionism equations for manufacturing and nonmanufacturing using 3SLS are presented in Tables 1, 2, results on the endogenous variables using OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS are presented in Tables 3, 4, 1970 census data (these run about 7 percent), but are quite similar to estimates of the internal rate of return for this period. The coefficients on t and t2 reflect the concavity of the earnings-experience profile, the profile being steeper in nonmanufacturing industries. The coefficients from the 3SLS regressions indicate that the earnings profile peaks at 35.6 years of experience (51.5 years of age) in manufacturing and 32.5 (49.2) in nonmanufacturing.
Inclusion of the standard deviations of schooling and experience, a(S) and a(t), adds significant explanatory power to the earnings equations, though a (S) is not significant in the manufacturing regressions. The negative sign on each indicates that p(rS), p(r*,t) < 0, implying that the rate of return to schooling is on average lower as schooling level increases, and earnings profiles are flatter in industries with older work forces. As expected, the log of earnings is significantly related to the log of weeks worked, and in manufacturing the elasticity of annual earnings with respect to weeks worked is significantly greater than unity.29
The percent blue-collar (production) workers is included as a control variable in the nonmanufacturing equation (its coefficient is close to zero in manufacturing). In manufacturing, average firm size (measured by sales) is negatively but not significantly related to earnings. Freeman and Medoff found a significant effect of firm size on earnings using microdata, while Masters has found plant (employment) size to be significant with aggregate data.30 Concentration is found to be negatively (though not significantly) related to earnings. Most previous studies have not found concentration to have a significant effect on earnings, however, after controlling in detail for personal characteristics.3"
The effect of unions on wage rates has been the focus of substantial study. We measure the proportionate union wage effect m = exp( a) -1, where a is the coefficient on U, and multiply by 100 for the percentage effect. Estimated union (weekly) wage effects in manufacturing are 3, 11, and 18 percent using OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS, respectively, while in nonmanufacturing they are 19, 7, and 2 percent, respectively. Almost all these estimates have large standard errors.
Despite the fact that, until recently, most estimates of union wage effects were based on grouped industry data that were probably inferior to the data used here (previous studies have used older data for manufacturing only, with fewer observations, less precise measures of unionism, and fewer controls for personal characteristics), we do not regard our estimates as reliable. Not only are the standard errors of these estimates large, but it was found that the union coefficients were sensitive to the functional form of the dependent variable (estimates from the theoretically appropriate log of the geometric mean were higher than from the arithmetic mean or median), to the choice of an earnings or wage variable (even when controlling for hours and weeks worked on the right-hand side), and to the estimation procedure.32 Inclusion of a(S) and a(t) in the earnings function and the joint estimation of the earnings and earnings-dispersion equations reduced estimated union wage effects.
As suggested some time ago by Rosen, and more recently by Freeman and Medoff and by Lewis, wage rates may be affected not only by union membership or coverage, but also by the extent of organization in an industry.33 While these separate effects cannot be identified with industry data (thus making interpretation of the unionism coefficient difficult), their existence suggests the possibility of nonlinear wage effects with respect to the extent of industry coverage. Unfortunately, the estimation of nonlinear union wage effects from our data was found to be highly imprecise.34 Finally, the existence of interactions between unionism and other explanatory variables, while not statistically significant with our data, again makes precise estimation of the average union wage effect difficult.
The problems encountered here in estimating the average union/nonunion differential from grouped data suggest that the use of individual data might be preferable, although analyses using such data also exhibit sensitivity to both specification and estimation technique. Industry data are better suited, however, for examining interindustry differences in unionism and earnings dispersion. Fortunately, other results of our model were rarely found to be sensitive to the changes in specification outlined above.
Earnings variation equation. Empirical results from the earnings dispersion model are presented in Table 2 . As predicted, earnings inequality is positively and significantly related to employment dispersion, the coefficients on a 2(1nWW) being highly significant in both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing. The effects of the schooling and experience distributions are obscured somewhat by the inability to hold constant the covariances between schooling, experience, and weeks worked. Consistent with the human-capital model, earnings inequality is positively and significantly related to the level of schooling, ceteris paribus.
Counter to the prediction from the human-capital model, however, the variance in schooling is negatively related to earnings inequality in nonmanufacturing, while unrelated in manufacturing. This probably results from our inability to hold constant the covariance between schooling and experience, which was shown to be significant in previous work. Because of the secular increase in schooling, earnings Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 66, No. 334 (June 1971), pp. 373-74. In addition, wage effects were estimated using a piecewise method similar to Rosen, "Trade Union Power." Some evidence of an increasing wage effect with coverage was found for manufacturing; no such pattern was found in nonmanufacturing. In all cases, standard errors of the estimates were large. aDependent variable is variance of log earnings, a2( nE). U-MEM is endogenous. In manufacturing, n=76; in nonmanufacturing, n= 11. differentials between highly schooled young workers and less highly schooled older workers are smaller than they would otherwise be. In manufacturing, the level of experience is associated with lower earnings dispersion while the variance of experience is positively associated with dispersion. In nonmanufacturing, both are positively related to earnings dispersion within industries. The percentage black employment is found to be positively related to earnings inequality within manufacturing industries, but not in nonmanufacturing.
As predicted, unionism is found to be negatively and significantly associated with intra-industry dispersion in earnings in both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. These findings lend strong support to those of Freeman regarding the equalizing effects of union wagestandardization policies. Moreover, unionism is found to decrease within-industry dispersion even after accounting for the endogeneity of the level of unionism.
In order to examine the robustness of this important finding, identical models were estimated using, alternatively, union coverage (U-COV) as a measure of unionism and the Gini coefficient (GINI) as a measure of earnings dispersion. These OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS partial results are summarized in Table 3 . Use of the Gini as a measure of inequality strongly reinforces our findings. Unionism, as measured by U-MEM or U-CO V, is found significantly to decrease earnings dispersion in both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing. The Gini coefficient, while not derived from the humancapital inequality model, may be the preferable inequality measure. It is less sensitive to assumptions about the mean of the openended earnings interval (estimated by the Pareto distribution) than is the variance of the log, the coefficient of variation over all 187 industries for GINI being .231, while that for U2(lnE) is .479. Similar results are obtained using U-COV as a measure of unionism, except that U-CO V is not found to be significantly related to earnings dispersion in manufacturing when using a 2 (lnE) as the inequality measure.
The results summarized in Table 3 some earnings interval, with its value decreasing as we move toward the tails of the distribution. Table 4 and InE are endogenous. In manufacturing, n=76; in nonmanufacturing, n= 1l.
Industries with a higher percent of bluecollar workers are found to be significantly more unionized in both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. The percentage female is negatively related to unionism, though this effect is stronger in manufacturing. A positive, but not statistically significant, relationship is found between unionism and the average years of experience of an industry's labor force. After accounting for other determinants of unionism, regional location of an industry's work force has no significant effect.
In manufacturing, unionization is found to be significantly greater in industries with larger firms. Concentration, which is highly correlated with SIZE, is not significantly related to unionization when SIZE is included, but is found to have a positive and highly significant coefficient when SIZE is excluded. As expected, in nonmanufacturing, unionism is found to be relatively greater in transportation, communication, and utilities (TCU), and relatively less in agriculture (AGR).
Industries with higher earnings levels are found to be more unionized in the manufacturing sector, even after accounting for simultaneity. This result is consistent with findings in other studies that have suggested that the effects of earnings on unionism may be statistically stronger than the opposite relationship. No significant relationship is found between ln(E) and U in the nonmanufacturing sector.
As discussed previously, we believe unionism is systematically related to the dispersion of earnings within an industry. On the one hand, industries with more homogenous workers will have worker preferences distributed more closely around the median voter, thus increasing the likelihood of unionism, ceteris paribus. Likewise, some benefits from collective bargaining may be higher and the costs of providing union services lower within industries with more homogeneous workers. On the other hand, greater dispersion in earnings in an industry is likely to generate increased demand for collective bargaining coverage as a means of lowering this dispersion (while raising wage levels) via union wage-standardization policies. Table 6 summarizes the results of the unionism-inequality relationship using two unionism measures, U-MEM and U-COV, and two earnings dispersion measures, a2(lnE) and GINI. Results in and GINI were included as variables in a logit union membership equation using individual data from the 1973 CPS tapes. GINI was found to be negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of union membership, while the coefficient on a 2( nE) was negative but insignificant. These results (available on request) were identical using either actual earnings dispersion or earnings dispersion predicted from a reduced-form equation. levels of union membership and coverage.
While reasons for the difference in results between the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors are not entirely clear, the findings are suggestive. If unionism is not less likely in manufacturing industries where earnings dispersion is larger, then it is likely that demand by workers in these industries for union-induced wage equalization is strong, offsetting fully or in part the greater difficulties involved in organizing and providing services for less homogeneous workers.
The level of unionism in nonmanufacturing industries is found to be significantly larger the lower is earnings dispersion. Greater worker homogeneity, implying less dispersion in preferences around the median worker, facilitates agreement on collective bargaining coverage and may be associated with higher benefits and lower organizing costs. The results also imply that worker demand for union wage standardization policies has played a relatively smaller role in the nonmanufacturing sector. This appears correct even though unionization in fact is found to have lessened earnings dispersion in both sectors, even after accounting for simultaneity.
Summary
The major argument of this paper is that not only do unions affect earnings dispersion within industries, but earnings dispersion will probably also affect an induetry's level of unionization. A model is developed in which the determination of earnings and earnings dispersion is based on the standard human-capital model, and the equilibrium level of unionism is determined by factors affecting its benefits and costs and the distribution of preferences around the median voter. The resulting three-equation model is estimated by OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS, using data from 76 manufacturing and 111 nonmanufacturing three-digit industries from 1970, thus providing evidence on the determinants of unionism, earnings, and earnings inequality.
An important finding of this study is that unionism significantly decreases earnings dispersion, even after accounting for their simultaneous determination. Moreover, the estimated equalizing effects of unionism appear to be larger, if anything, using simultaneous-equation techniques. The estimated effect of earnings dispersion on the level of unionization is found to differ between the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. In manufacturing, no consistent relationship between unionism and earnings dispersion is found, suggesting that worker demand for union-induced wage equalization may be strong in those industries. In nonmanufacturing, earnings inequality significantly decreases the level of unionism. This suggests that worker demand for wage equalization here is relatively weaker, while the homogeneity of worker preferences and their distribution around those of the median worker are important determinants of the level of unionism. The natural log of (the value of industry shipments/number of (1.176) firms in the industry in 1972). Sources are the same as for the concentration ratios.
